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1. 
Introduct ion
This  paper   considers   problems   associated  with   the   use   of 
probabilistic   and   fuzzy  methods   to   deal   with  uncertainty   in   decision 
support   systems.   A  distinction   is   drawn   between   the   statistical   approach 
to   inference   and   the  use   of  probability   and   fuzzy  methods  within  a 
structured ,   knowledge  based  approach.     The   application   of   these 
contrasting  methods   within  a   structured  approach   is   considered  and 
drawbacks of   the   two  methods   noted.   The   nature   of  uncertainty   is then 
investigated  and  a   distinction   is  made   between   two  types   of  uncertainty: 
uncertainty   in   frequency   of  occurrence   and  uncertainty   in   similarity 
judgements.   These   two  types  of  uncertainty   are   examined  and   it   is 
concluded   that   probability   is   the   natural   formalism   for   the   former   type 
and   that   fuzzy   methods   fit  more   naturally  with   the   lat ter   type. 
Consideration   of   similarity   judgements   points   toward   the   research   that   is 
necessary  for   a  useful   fuzzy   theory. 
Structured  and  unstructured  processes.
In   contrasting   the   probabilistic  and   fuzzy   approaches   an  argument 
often   used  against   probability   is   the   inadequacy   of   statistical  methods   in 
providing   decision   support   systems   for   complex  situations   [1].   For   the 
sake   of   a   concrete   exposition,   the   discussion  will   be   set   in   the field of 
medical   diagnosis   systems.  This   is   a   field   in  which  both   fuzzy  and 
probabilistic,    knowledge-based  and   statistical   approaches   have   been 
tried    2.  Data   is   available   in  the  form   of   patient's   symptoms   and    a 
decision   is   to  be  made   about   the   disease   causing   these   symptoms.  The   pure 
statistical   approach   is   to   find  a   correlation  between   symptoms   and 
diseases  without   constructing  any   intervening  model   of   the   process   l inking 
the   two.      In   this   sense   it   is   an  unstructured  process.     Past   data   or 
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subjective  beliefs   are   used   to  estimate   p(S|D) ,   the   probability   that   a 
particular   set   of   symptoms   S  would  arise   from  a  particular   disease  D   , 
for   all   possible   combinations   of   s   and    D.   The   great   practical   drawback 
is   that   the  number  of  possible   combinations  of    symptoms   is   generally 
enormous   so   that   sufficient   data   is   not   available  (and  even   if   it   were the 
task  of  estimating  and.  storing   all   the   p(S|D)   would   be   prohibitive).     In 
effect   this   approach   is   a   complete   enumeration   of   all  possible  paths   from 
symptoms   to  diseases. 
Because   the   data   requirements   are   fatal   to   the   application   of   this 
approach   in   its   pure   form,   the   general   response   has   been   to   assume 
independence   of   the   various   symptoms  conditional   on   the   disease: 
                                p (S1  ,S2  , . . .  Sn |D)   =  p (S1  |  D).. .p (Sn  |  D) 
Using  Bayes  Theorem  and .taking  logs  of  the  odds  on   D  ,   p(D)/p( D ) ,   we 
get: 
( ) ( )
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giving a  simple  addit ive   score   where   the   effect   of   each   symptom   is   to  add 
its   ' we ight   of   evidence'    to   the   prior   odds   on     D.  With  this   assumption 
only   the   P(Si|D)   need   to  be   estimated   separately   (not   the joint 
P(Si . ..Sn|D))  which   enormously   reduces  the   data   requirements   and  makes   the 
computation   feasible.      This   in   essence   constitutes   the   statistical 
approach   to   inference. 
The   knowledge   based  approach   to   inference   is   by   contrast   essentially 
structured.     A  model   is  constructed  which  aims   to  capture  what  an  expert 
knows  about   his   field.     It  may   include   interactions  between   symptoms  and 
how   diseases   and   symptoms   are   l inked  through   intermediate   parts   of   the 
system,   e.g.   by   firstly  deciding  whether    there   is   a  l iver   disease   before 
3. 
going  on   to  reach   a   final   diagnosis.     The   inference   procedure   is   often 
expressed   by  production   rules    [3] ,   typically   of   the   form: 
IF symptom  A and  symptom  B  and   ... THEN  hypothesis  H  with   certainty  C. 
Thus   symptoms   are   considered  as   interacting  groups   rather   than   independent 
contributors   to   the   diagnosis,    and   there   is   not  necessarily   a   direct   l ink 
from   symptoms   to   disease   but   instead   intermediate   hypotheses   are 
considered .    Data   for   these   structured  systems   is   needed   to   give   values   to 
the   certainty   factors,   but   these   need   to  be   estimated  only   for   the 
particular   (S,H)   symptoms-hypothesis   sets   occuring   in   the   expert   derived 
inference   rules,    not   for   all    possible   sets,    and  so   the   computational   task 
is  greatly  reduced. 
The   general   failure   of   statistical   methods   to  provide  useful   and 
acceptable  decision   support   systems   in  such  complex   areas,  due  largely   to 
the   data  requirements  and   independence   assumptions   outlined  above,   has 
attached  a  certain   degree   of  guilt   by   association   to   the  use   of 
probabilit ies   in   expert   systems.      Statistical   models   use   probability,    but 
probability   can  equally  well  be  used   in  a   knowledge-based   system.     Fuzzy 
and  probabilistic   approaches  within   such   a   system  are   now  considered. 
Structured   systems - probabilistic   and   fuzzy   approaches . 
If   probabilit ies   are   to  be  used   for   the  uncertainty   factors   within  a 
knowledge   based-system,   then  as  previously  mentioned,   the   data 
requirements   are   reduced   to  ascertaining  probabilit ies   for   the   (S.,H)   sets 
occurring   in   the   rule-base.     For  a   large   system  this  will   still  be 
computationally  prohibitive   and   so,   as  before,   the   assumption   of 
independence of   the  symptoms  must   be  made 
p(S1,. . . Sn| H)  =  p(S1 |lH)  . . .    p(Sn| H ) 
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Since   the   rules   often   group   together   specifically   dependent   sets   of 
symptoms   this   leads   to  a  prima   facie   contradiction  between   the   inference 
structure   and   the  uncertainty  measure.     Apart   from   this   dependency   problem 
another   difficulty   arises   in   the   absence   of   data   to   accurately  estimate   a 
probability.     A  subjective  estimate  needs   to  be  made   and  arguments   against 
subjective   prior   distributions   are   well   known   in   Statistics   [4] .      Although 
the   use   of   probability  brings   these   problems ,   it   does  have   the   advantage 
of   an  axiomatic   behavioural    foundation   [5]   I t    is    therefore   possible   to 
have   confidence   that   the   operations   of  probability   theory   are   the  most 
' ra t ional '    operat ions    possible    i f    the    behavioural    axioms   are    accepted  as  
desirable   for   rat ional   thought ,   which   they   generally   are.  At   the   very 
least,   a   probabilistic   system  wi11   be   attempting   to  approximate   these  most 
rational   operations   as  closely   as   possible .  
Fuzzy  sets   were   intended   to  be   used  in  dealing  with   cooplex   systems 
such   as   these,   where   statistical   methods   cannot    easily   be   applied.     A 
fuzzy   set   A  consists   of   a  universe   X     and  a   mapping 
                                               µA  :   X    →  |  0,1| . 
µA  (x), x∈  x,    is   the   degree   of   membership   of  x  in  A 
                                                   ( ) ( )xAμ1x-Aμ −=
As   operat ions   to   combine   fuzzy   sets   Zadeh    |6|   suggested: 
µAUB(x)   =   Max{A   (x),   µB(x)} 
                                                             ( ) ( ) ( )}xAμ,xAMin{ μxBAμ =∩  
however,   these   operators   are   not   the   only   ones   possible.     The   possible 
operators   depend   on   the   set - theoretic   axioms   we   would   like   U  &   ∩  to 
satisfy,   and   ideas   on   these   differ.     The   notion   of   membership   is   quite 
wide   and   not   restricted   to   measuring   the   likelihood   of   occurrences.     Thus 
membership   functions   can   be  constructed   for   concepts  such  as   'hot ' : 
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A =   'hot' 
     x 
X =   [0,100] C
 
Linguistic   1 hedges'   can  also be   dealt   with   by   simple   expedients,   e.g.   for 
B =  'very   hot'   we  might   use  ( ) ( ).x2AμxBμ =  
By   considering   µ(x)   as   a   ‘possibility’   of     x     occurring,   membership 
functions   can  be   used   specifically   to   measure   l ikelihood,    forming  a   direct 
replacement   for   subjective   probability   and   intended   for   cases   where 
objective   frequency   data   is   not   available .     The   possibility   of     x 
is   πA.    (x) .      This   can  be   thought   of   as   the   possibility   of     x    occurring 
out   of   the   set   of   all   possible   outcomes   represented   by     A 
ΠA     (x)  =   µA (x)  
The   operations   postulated  by   Zadeh    [7]   are   similar   to   those   for   fuzzy 
sets : 
ΠA,B    (x y)   -   Max {ΠU A  (X),    ΠB   (y)} 
and   if    the  variables   are   non-interactive,   i .e.    the   possible   outcomes   in 
A  do not   depend   on   the   outcome   occurring   in  B  and   vice-versa,   then 
ΠA  B(x∩y)   = Min{πA(x),  πB(y)} 
In  application   this   noninteractive   condition   is   generally   assumed   to 
hold.  It   is  weaker  than   probabilistic   independence   which   implies   it    [8] . 
Conditional   possibilities   can  also  be  defined  — they   have   the   property 
that   they   are   usually   identical   with   the   joint   possibilities.      Although 
there   is   a   theoretical   distinction  between  membership   functions   and 
possibilities   the   fact   that   possibility   is   defined  as   a   membership 
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function  and   that   the   standard   operations   are   the   same   in  both   cases  means 
that    there   is    l i t t le   dist inction   in   the   propogation   of  uncertainty 
measures   in  practice. 
There   are   a  number   of  problems  with   the   fuzzy   approach .   Firstly 
there  is  the  question  of   how  membership   function   values   are   obtained. 
This   is   essentially   a   subjective   choice   on   the   part   of   the  modeller,    and 
corresponds   to   the   problem  of   choosing   a   subjective   prior   distribution   in 
probability.     Secondly ,    the   choice   of   fuzzy   operators   is   also   subjective 
|9| .   Max   and  min   operators   tend   to   be   used  as   the   default    operators,   but 
as   they  often   do  not   give   results   considered   sensible ,   modellers   do   not 
hesitate   to   replace   them  with   other   (ad-hoc)   operations   which   give    better 
results    in   their    part icular   application.      Thirdly,    the   problem   of 
dependent   variables   noted   for   probabili t ies   is    equally   present  under   the 
fuzzy  approach   although  hidden  by   the   definition  of   the   operators.      Under 
the   non   interaction  assumption   the   same   operator   is   applied   to  variables 
which  are   dependent   and   independent   in   probabilistic   terms .    This   is 
equivalent   to   assuming   independence   in   the   probability   framework. 
Fourthly,   the   application   to   inference   rules   is   not   straightforward.     For 
a   rule   of   form: 
If  S1  and  S2   then  H  with  certainty  0.4  ,   
where   the  possibility  values  of   S1 and  S2   have  been  established  at   0.7  and 
0.5,  use  of  the  Min  operator   gives  a   possibility   value of  0,5  for   (S1   and 
S2)  but  there  remains  the  problem  of   how  to  combine  this   with the  rule 
certainty   of  0.4  in   order   to  end  up  with   the   possibility  value   of  H 
Again,  approaches   to   this   tend   to  be   ad-hoc.  Fifthly,   there   is   no 
behavioural   axiomatic  derivation   for   fuzzy   sets  and  so  the  implications  of 
the  operations  as  a  model  for  human   behaviour   are  not  clear.     Certain 
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set-theoretic   conditions   and   restricted     operator   spaces   can  be   shown   tp 
lead  to  the  use  of  Max  and  Min  operators,  but   although  these   conditions 
may   look  pleasing  from  a   mathematical   viewpoint   it  is   not  clear  that  they 
constitute   desirable   behavioural   rules.    Fung  &   Fu   |10|   consider   combining 
the  fuzzy  preferences  of  group  members   to  obtain  a   fuzzy   preference   for 
the  whole   group.   They   set   down   rather  restrictive   axioms   of   combination 
which   lead  to  the  use of   Max  and  Min  operators,   but   these   behavioural 
axioms   are  not   obviously   desirable   ones,   even   in   this   special   case  of 
group   decision  making. 
Frequency   and   Similarity
Uncertainty   as   studied   in  probability  and   statistics   is   a  measure   of 
how  likely  an  event   is   to  occur.    It  is  essentially   the   study   of 
frequencies   of   events.     A  frequency  view  of  probability   acknowledges   this 
explicitly   and  a   subjectivist   "degree   of  belief"  view   is   founded  on 
behavioural   principles   such  as   avoiding   loss  in  a   repeated   sequence   of 
gambles.     Although   there  may  be   no  directly  applicable   data ,   a   subjective 
belief   in   the   probability   of   an  event  will   be  based   on  cons iderations   of 
the   frequency  of  other  similar  events.     The  mathematical   axioms   of 
probability  are  designed   to  make   sense  when   interpreted   in   this 
frequentia1   manner. 
This   is   not   the   only   type   of  uncertainty,   however,  as  is  shown  by 
considering   some   problems.     Consider   a   distribution   (or   membership 
function)   for   remaining   l ife   after   detection   of   a   serious   disease. 
 
Remaining  life   (Yrs). 
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This  may   have  been  obtained  from  a  person  with  only   a   vague  belief   that   it 
will  be   somewhere   in   the   1-5  year  region  and  more   likely  around  3  years, or 
from  a  person  who has  derived  this  curve   from  a   study   of  much   data  about 
the   lives   of   this  sort   of   patient.     Clearly   these   two   persons’   curves 
should   not   be  treated  as  holding  the   same   information.     Yet   if  a   frequency 
distribution   is   the   only   way  of  encoding  uncertainty   then   there   is  no  way 
to  represent   the  difference   in   certainties   expressed   by  the   two 
distributions.     This   difference   exists  because   the   second   person  has 
derived  his  judgement  entirely   from  frequency   information   whereas  the 
first  person  has  had  to  supplement  any  frequency   information  he   had   with 
frequency   information  from   other   similar   examples.  e.g.   similar   diseases. 
As another   example,   if  we   have  data  on  past  predictions  of   time  left 
to  live  made   by   two   consultants   then  we  might  wish  to  assess  our  degree o 
confidence   in  each  consultant.     In  order   to  do   this   it   is   necessary   to 
examine   their  predictions   and   the   actual   outcomes•      If  neither   consultant 
is  precisely   accurate   then   it   does  not  make   sense   to   talk   of   the 
frequencies  of   their  being  right,   and  the   assessment  must  be  made  on  the 
basis   of   the   similarity  between   two   patterns:      the   pattern  of   predictions 
and  the  pattern  of   outcomes. 
These  examples   indicate   that   there   is   a   second   kind   of  uncertainty 
which   is   an  uncertainty  not  of   how  likely   an  event   is  but   of  how  similar 
it   is   to   others-     This   notion   of   similarity   is  not   frequency-based   in   th 
"likely"   sense.     I t    is  a   question   of   categorization  and   thus   relates   to 
the   idea  of  a   'degree  of  membership'       For  example,   is  a   psychiatrist 's  
couch  more  similar   to  a  chair   or  a  bed?    There   is  uncertainty  here  which 
cannot   be  quantified   in   frequency   terms.   A  figure  on  a  0-1  scale  may  be 
used  to  quantify   this  type   of  uncertainty  but   it   is   not   a   frequency 
9. 
measurement,  rather  an  assessment  of   the  degree  of   similarity  between  two 
structural   descriptions   or   patterns.     This   type   of   uncertainty   is   present 
in   linguistic   statements   involving    'hedges'   e.g.    'it   is   quite   hot'  where 
'quite'    is   indicative   of   degree   of   similarity.     Even   when  uncertainty 
could  be   assessed   purely   from   frequencies,   it   is  unlikely   that  humans 
often   do   so -   it   seems    intuitively   more  likely   that   consultants  match 
incomplete   patterns   of   symptoms   with   patterns   typica1   of   diseases   rather 
than   performing   complex   frequency   calculations   in   their   heads. 
So   in  making  uncertainty   judgements   humans   are   generally   doing   two 
things   (i)  making  a   judgement   as   to   how  similar  aspects   of   one  event    are 
to   aspects  of   other  events   (ii)   using   these   other   events   to  make   a 
frequency   judgement.     Both  probability   and   fuzzy   set   approaches   attempt   to 
treat   these   two   different   types   of   uncertainty   in   the   same   way. 
Probabilities   are   treated   by   the   same   rules   irrespective   of   the   input    from 
frequency   and   similarity   considerations.      In   the   fuzzy   approach   there   is  a 
theoret ical    d is t inct ion  between  possibi l i t ies    and  membership   funct ions,  
but   since   a  possibility  is   a   particular   membership  value   and   the  same   Max, 
Min  operations   are   used   in  both   cases,   this   distinction   disappears   in 
practice . 
Uncertainty   of   frequency.
For   this   type   of  uncertainty,   the   previous   exposition   has   indicated   a 
sounder  axiomatic  development  and   fewer  problems   in  application   for  the 
probability   formalism   relative   to   the   fuzzy   approach.      The  main   difficulty 
in  application   is   that   of   dependent   variables,   also  present   in   the   fuzzy 
case.   To  overcome  this   several  methods  have  been   proposed,   including 
fitting  "weighting   factors"    {a i}  to   the   equation: 
( )
( )
( )( )∑+= i H|iSP
H|iSPlogai0aS|HP
S|HPlog  
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for  a  set   of  values   of    S .     The  a  are  intended   to  improve   the  fit   by 
'dampening   down'   the  weights  of   evidence;  however  any   linear  model   is 
necessarily   unable   to   account   for   strong   interactions  between   two  or  more 
variables.      Another   suggest ion   is   the   use   of  "Lancaster  models"    |11 |. 
There   is   no   Sth   order   interaction   in   the   Lancaster   sense   among     n 
variables     x     if 
      ( ) 0iF*iFπ Ai =−∈   ,       for   all   A ⊆    {1,…,n}  , |  A | =  S +1 
where   F     is   a   dummy,     replaced  after  multiplication  by   →t...FrF*j...F*iF
Fi .  .  . . j ,    Fr  . . . .Ft     and   Fi .  .  .  .  . j    is   the   joint   distribution   of   (xi... xj).     No 
1st   order   interaction  means   complete   independence.     If   there   is  no  Sth 
order  interaction  then  F1 . . . . n  can  be   constructed  from  knowing  Fi  .  .  j     for 
all   |{i,. . . ,j}|   =    S.   Thus   if   we  assume  no  2nd   order   interaction  we   need 
only  know  the   joint   distribution   for   all   pairs   of  variables   in   order   to 
construct   the   complete   joint   distribution   for   all      n     variables.      In 
effect,   no   2nd  order   interaction  allows   dependency   only   within   pairs   of 
variables   and  not   between   these   pairs.     Problems   of   this  method  are   that 
interaction  may   occur   between  3   or  more  variables   and   that   the   number of 
pairs,     n(n+l),   grows   rapidly  with     n      .       Other   possibilities   are   to 
reduce   the   number   of  variables   (S1,...,Sn)   to   a  manageable   size   by  using  a 
data   reduction   technique   such   as   factor   analysis,   principal   components   or 
multidimensional   scaling.     However,   if   explanatory   power   is   desirable   in 
the  system  then  the  opacity  of  this  approach  is  a   drawback  even   if   the 
data   reduction  proves   possible. 
Uncertainty   of    similarity.
For   this   type  of  uncertainty   the   idea  of  events   having   degrees  of 
membership   in  a   shared   class   is   clearly   relevant   to  measuring   similarity, 
pointing  toward  the   use   of   fuzzy   sets.     However,   there   is   still   the 
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question  of   whether   the   operations   of   fuzzy   sets   are  useful   in  measuring 
similarity   of  concepts.     It   seems  not.     Osherson &  Smith   [12]   point  out 
that   goldfish   is  more   typical   of   the   concept   'pet   fish'   (and  will 
therefore   have  a  higher  membership   value)   than   it   is   of   'pet'   or  of 
'fish' .    But  use   of   the  Min   rule   of  corabinat ion  gives   the   opposite  result . 
There  is  a  need  for  a  study  of  how  humans  compare  concepts  -  matching 
patterns  or   their   features   against   one   another.    How  should   such 
similarities   be  measured  and   combined   and  how  should   they   interact  with 
probabilities?     A   preliminary   discussion  of   this   point   is   given   in   Cohen 
and  Murphy [13].      This   is    a   question  central    to  art if icial    intell igence 
since   it   is   bound  up  with  knowledge   representation  and   the   formation  of 
concepts:  measures   of   similarity  will   differ   depending   on   the   way   in 
which  knowledge   is   structured   into  patterns   and  held  and   conversely   the 
aggregation   of   similar   instances   into  concepts   presupposes   a  measure   of 
similarity. 
The  idea  that   an   instance  has  a degree  of   membership   in  a  class  or  concept 
is  strongly   linked   to  the   psychological   theory   of   prototypes   [14]  .    Thus 
the  potential  use   of   fuzzy   sets   in  knowledge   based   systems  is   likely  to  be 
with   prototypically   structured  knowledge   bases.     The   present  move   toward 
frame-based   representations   is   a  move   in   this   direction. 
Conclusions
Uncertainty   can  be   divided   into   two   types:      frequency   and 
similarity.     These   two   types   require   different   treatment   and   rather   than 
being  rivals,   the  probability  and  fuzzy  approaches  can  be   seen  as 
complementary,   with   probability   having   the  greater   relevance   to   frequency 
measurement   and  fuzzy   sets   the  greater  relevance  to  similarity 
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measurement .  Although  the  concept   of   degree   of  membership  is   correct  for 
similarities,    the  operations   of  combination   currently  used  are 
unsatisfactory.     It   is   suggested   that   fuzzy   set   theory   should  develop   in 
the   direction  of   providing   a   useful   theory   of   similarity,   based   on  human 
judgements,  and   that   such  development  should   proceed   hand-in-hand  with 
developments   in   knowledge   representation   formalisms. 
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